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The Bitcoin network is burning a large amount of energy for mining. In this paper
we estimate the lower bound for the global energy cost for a period of ten years from
2010, taking into account changing oil costs, improvements in hashing technologies
and hashing activity. Despite a ten-billion-fold increase in hashing activity and a
ten-million-fold increase in total energy consumption, we find the cost relative to the
volume of transactions has not increased nor decreased since 2010. This is consis-
tent with the perspective that, in order to keep a the Blockchain system secure from
double spending attacks, the proof or work must cost a sizable fraction of the value
that can be transferred through the network [1, 2]. We estimate that in the Bitcoin
network this fraction is of the order of 1%.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a digital currency launched in 2009 by an anonymous inventor or group of
inventors under the alias of Satoshi Nakamoto [3]. It is the largest cryptocurrency in market
capitalization with over 100 billion dollars [4–6]. As a decentralized currency, Bitcoin differs
from government regulated fiat currencies in that there exists no central authority within
the network to verify transactions and prevent frauds and attacks. Instead, Bitcoin relies on
a highly replicated public ledger, secured by means of a hash chain and validated through
community consensus. All users can announce a new transaction but such a transaction
will be considered valid and included in the ledger only once it is verified by a majority of
the network nodes. Transactions are written into blocks that are interlocked into a chain
by hashes. Hashing is a one-way function that maps an input of arbitrary length into a
string of a fixed number of digits. The hash function must guarantee that the output string
2is (quasi-)uniquely related to the given input (deterministic) and that small changes in the
input should cause arbitrarily large changes in the output so that reconstructing the input
based on the output is infeasible. In the case of Bitcoin, the transactions in the new proposed
block and the header of the most recent block is inputted into the SHA-256 hash algorithm,
making therefore a chain with unique direction. Such a chain is at the heart of the Bitcoin
security because it makes it difficult to alter the content of a block once subsequent blocks
are added to the chain. In Bitcoin, this cryptographic sealing process through a hash chain
is intentionally designed to be computationally intensive by accepting hashes only if the
randomly generated hash number is smaller than a given target. Therefore the community
performs a large number of hashing by modifying a random component of the block content
until, by chance, someone finds a ‘valid’ hash that is smaller than the threshold. This is
called proof of work (PoW) and serves the purpose to determine majority consensus. Indeed,
in an anonymous distributed system, participants can arbitrarily generate new identities so
consensus cannot be accounted in terms of individuals. Rather, it must be accounted in
terms of some participation cost demonstrating the commitment of computational power.
In the words of Satoshi Nakamoto, one CPU one vote [3].
Users are incentivized to participate to the block validation by assigning newly mined
Bitcoins to the first who randomly finds a hash with a value smaller than the threshold.
Presently, this remuneration is 6.25 Bitcoins, corresponding to around USD 60,000 at the
current exchange rate (see Table I). For this reason the hashing process is called ‘mining’.
Sometimes forks occur in the blockchain when two blocks containing different transactions
are attached to the same block. Eventually other blocks are mined and attached to them,
forming two branching chains after the fork. In this case, the longer chain, the one with
more cumulative proof of work or hash computations, would be considered as the main chain
upon which future blocks are built on. Normally a block is considered finally valid after 6
blocks are attached to its chain, which takes approximately one hour.
The Bitcoin proof of work is very costly. Technological improvements over the years
have made hashing a very efficient operation, consuming at little as 0.03 joules per billion
hashes (with specifically-designed Application-Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC, machines.
See Table II). This has reduced energy cost per hash by about thirty thousand times during
the last ten years. However, the miners in the Bitcoin network are presently (May 2020)
computing nearly 1025 hashes per day, up over 10 orders of magnitude from the 2010 levels.
3We estimate in this paper that this hashing activity currently corresponds to an energy cost
of around 1 million USD per day and around a billion USD over the past year. In turn, this
corresponds a per transaction costs as high as 13 USD in January 2020. This cost is not
borne by either the sender nor the receiver in a transaction but rather by the miners.
While a billion a year burned in hashing is definitely a large amount of money that
could be seen as a waste of resources, the Bitcoin proof of work is a necessary process for
such an anonymous permission-less network to function. It is indeed required to validate
transactions and obtain community consensus to secure the system from attacks.
One question arises: is this cost fair or could it be lowered? In [1] made the argument
that, at equilibrium, the cost of Bitcoin proof of work should be such to make a double
spending attack too expensive to be profitably carried out. From this principle, it is relatively
straightforward to estimate the fair cost of the proof of work under an ideal equilibrium
assumption. Let us consider an attacker that owns some amount of Bitcoin and wants to
artificially multiply it by spending the same Bitcoin with several different users. This is
known as a double spend attack. The attacker will try to double spend the largest amount
of Bitcoin possible, but this is limited to the amount normally exchanged within a block
(which, we estimate in this paper, is currently around $10 million). Indeed, a transaction
involving a substantially larger sum than the usual will capture unwanted attention from the
network. Of course, the duplication can be repeated several times both in parallel or serially
but, as we shall see shortly, this does not affect the outcomes of the present argument.
To be successful the attacker must make sure that both the duplicated transactions are
validated and this requires the generation of a fork with two blocks containing the double
spent transaction attached to the previous block. If the attacker has sufficient computing
power, she can generate two valid hashes to seal the two blocks giving the false impression
that both transactions have been verified and validated. However, for a final settlement
of the transaction, it is presently considered that one should wait six new blocks to be
attached to the chain to make the transaction statistically unlikely to be reverted. The
attacker should therefore use her computing power to generate six valid hashes before the
double spent transaction might be considered settled. Note that only one of the two forks
(the shortest) must be artificially validated by the attacker since the other will be considered
valid by the system and can be let to propagate by the other miners. Of course, it is quite
unrealistic to assume that nobody notices the propagating fork for such a long time, but lets
4keep this as a working hypothesis. The artificial propagation of the fork has a cost that is
the cost of the proof of work per block times six. The attacker will make profits if this cost
is inferior to the gain made from duplicated spending. In the previous unpublished note by
[1] the following formula is reported:
Equilibrium fair cost of proof of work per block =
duplicated fraction of the value of a block
number of blocks required for settlement
.
(1)
We can re-write this formula to formally express the cost of proof of work per day, Ct, as
Ct =
pVt
N
(2)
where:
p is the duplicated proportion of block transaction volume;
Vt is the average transaction volume on day t;
N is the number of blocks required for settlement.
In Eq.2 N is roughly equal to 6 and the current average volume of transaction is about
Vt ∼ 1 billion USD a day but it was only a few thousands dollars a day in 2010. The value
of p must be considerably smaller than one because an attacker will be spotted immediately
by the community if she tries to fork with a large double-spent value with operations that
involve a significant portion of the entire network activity. We must note that this formula
is an upper bound for the cost of the proof of work. It greatly underestimates the costs
of an attack and largely overestimates the attacker’s gains. It indeed considers a system
that has no other protections or security system than the proof of work. Further, it does
not consider that after a successful attack, the Bitcoin value is likely to plunge making it
therefore unlikely for the attacker to spend her gain at current market value. Finally, we
should take into account that the attacker must have control over more than 50% of the
hashing power. This requires either huge investments in mining equipment (not taken into
account in the formula) or other methods to control the mining farms, such as through a
cyber or a conventional physical attack, which will also cost considerable amount of money.
Therefore, we expect the parameter p to be of the order of 1% or less.
Independently on the estimate of a realistic value for the parameter p, the principle that
the cost of the proof of work must be a sizable fraction of the value transferred by the
network to avoid double spending attacks should rest valid. Specifically, according to this
principle, we expect that, for a given system, the ratio between the cost of the proof of work
5and the value transferred by the network should oscillate around some constant value which
reflects the fair balance between the possible gains in an attack and the cost to perform it.
In this paper, we test if this is indeed the case for the Bitcoin proof of work. For this purpose
we are looking across the entire period of existence of Bitcoin, estimating the mining costs
and comparing them with the value transferred through the network. This is an amazing
period during which the value transferred through the Bitcoin network has increased several
million times and the hashing activity has increased by 10 orders of magnitude. Let us
note that ten orders of magnitude is an immense change. To put it into perspective this is
the ratio between the diameter of the sun and the diameter of a one-cent coin. These are
formidable changes to a scale never observed in financial systems or in human activity in
general. We show in this paper that, despite these underlying formidable changes in the
Bitcoin mining and trading activities, the ratio between the estimated mining cost and the
transaction volume rests oscillating within a relatively narrow band supporting therefore the
argument about the fair cost of the proof of work by [1].
Start date Bitcoin reward
3 Jan 2009 50.00
28 Nov 2012 25.00
9 Jul 2016 12.50
11 May 2020 6.25
TABLE I: Bitcoin reward per block mined.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Estimation of the lower bound for the cost of Bitcoin mining
The cost of Bitcoin mining is composed of three key elements: 1. the energy cost of
mining; 2. the overheads for the maintenance of the mining farm such as infrastructure
costs and cooling facilities; 3. the cost of purchasing and renewing the mining hardware.
For the purpose of this study, we focus only on the first element, the energy cost of running
the Bitcoin mining hardware which is likely to be the largest part of the cost and is the
only one that can be estimated with some precision. The maintenance costs for running a
6Type Hardware name Date J/Th
CPU ARM Cortex A9 3 Oct 2007 877193
GPU ATI 5870M 23 Sep 2009 264550
FPGA X6500 FPGA Miner 29 Aug 2011 43000
ASIC Canaan AvalonMiner Batch 1 1 Jan 2013 9351
ASIC KnCMiner Jupiter 5 Oct 2013 1484
ASIC Antminer U1 1 Dec 2013 1250
ASIC Bitfury BF864C55 3 Mar 2014 500
ASIC RockerBox 22 Jul 2014 316
ASIC ASICMiner BE300 16 Sep 2014 187
ASIC BM1385 19 Aug 2015 181
ASIC PickAxe 23 Sep 2015 140
ASIC Antminer S9-11.5 1 Jun 2016 98
ASIC Antminer R4 1 Feb 2017 97
ASIC Ebang Ebit 10 15 Feb 2018 92
ASIC 8 Nano Compact 1 May 2018 51
ASIC Antminer S17 9 Apr 2019 36
ASIC Antminer S19 Pro 23 Mar 2020 30
TABLE II: Mining hardware with optimal energy efficiency and their dates of release.
Bitcoin mining farm varies widely depending on the location, design and scale of the facility
and since such information are usually not disclosed to the public, it is infeasible to estimate
it accurately. The sales price of mining hardware is publicly available but incorporating
it into cost calculations is arduous because of the rapid rate of evolution in the industry
and the information opacity regarding the market share of each hardware and the rate at
which obsolete mining hardware are replaced. Newer mining hardware may achieve faster
hash rates and higher energy efficiency but the renewing costs makes it unlikely that all
Bitcoin miners immediately replace all their existing mining hardware with the the latest
versions as they are released. Certainly a combination of both old and new mining hardware
should coexist in the Bitcoin network as long as each machine continue to generate a profit.
However, the market share of each hardware and its evolution over time is an unknown.
7With respect to the purpose of the present estimate of the lower bound of the mining cost,
we must stress that the maintenance and the hardware costs must be anyway proportional to
the energy consumption costs. By ignoring them we are under-estimating the total mining
cost by some factor (presumably between 10% to 20%) but, beside this factor, the estimation
of the overall behavior of the mining cost should not be significantly affected.
B. Data
Historic Bitcoin prices, the average hash rate, and the number of blocks per day from
2010 to 2020 were collected from [13] and the estimated total value of all transactions on
the Bitcoin network was sourced from [14]. Hash efficiency and other information regarding
Bitcoin mining hardware were aggregated from manufacturer data and previous studies [7]
and independently verified. Historical Brent Crude oil spot prices were collected from the
United States EIA [15]. The conversion rate between joules and barrels of oil equivalent,
which may vary depending on oil grade, was set at 1 barrel = 5.54543 gigajoules based on
the figures released by the BEIS. [16]
C. Estimation of the energy costs of Bitcoin mining
A mining hardware has an energy consumption that can be measured in joules per ter-
ahash (J/Th), and has a hashing speed that can be measured in terahashes per second
(Th/s). For the purpose of estimating a lower bound to the energy costs of Bitcoin mining,
we considered at any point in time that the entire network is adopting the most energy
efficient machine available at that time. In situations where a mining hardware has different
power setting options in which the user may choose to increase or decrease the hashing speed
of the machine along with energy consumption, the most efficient power setting is used for
calculation.
Most prior works has priced energy usage according to global average electricity prices
(see for instance [7–9]). We have taken instead a slightly different approach by converting
the energy consumption into barrels of oil equivalent and priced the oil according to the
Brent Crude spot price. Indeed, the Brent Crude oil price is a publicly available daily
value standardized around the world whereas electricity prices varies widely across different
8countries and suppliers and the actual price paid by the miner is not accessible. Note that
there is a premium that electricity producers and distributors charge on the electricity price
with respect to the oil cost and there can be also taxes. These extra charges depends on
countries and situations but it is reasonable to figure out that they must add at least a 30%
extra to our estimate of the lower bound. However, coherently with our approach, we do
not increase our figure by any assumed fraction, but we must bear in mind that our lower
bound is certainly under-estimating the actual energy cost.
The lower bound of the energy costs of Bitcoin mining is estimated from total number of
hashes times the energy cost of hashing by the most energy efficient Bitcoin mining hardware
available on the market at any give time, divided by the conversion factor between energy
and barrel of oil and multiplyed by the cost of the oil. Specifically, the lower bound for daily
mining cost, Ct, is:
Ct =
etHt
b
Pt (3)
where:
et is the energy efficiency of the most efficient mining hardware available on day t in (J/Th)
ht is the daily number of hashing operations in (Th) on day t;
b is the joule of energy equivalent per barrels of oil ≈ 5.55× 109 (J/barrel);
Pt is the Brent crude oil spot price (USD/barrel) on day t.
III. RESULTS
A. Hardware efficiency variations
Table II reports a list of the Bitcoin mining hardware which consumed the least energy
per hash operations at the time of their release to the market. The improvement in energy
efficiency for Bitcoin mining over time is reported in Figure 1 where each symbol represents
the most energy efficiency hardware at the respective time and the red dotted line displays
a best-fit with an exponential curve: Energy Consumption ∼ c exp(−λt). The best fit
parameter is λ = 0.0025, which means that hardware efficiency has been doubling every 10
months in average. In a previous work a power-law model was proposed by [10]. However,
the exponential model is more consistent with what is commonly expected for the rate of
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FIG. 1: Estimate of the lower bound for the energy consumption of the most efficient Bitcoin
mining hardware, measured in J/Th.
technology growth, according to the Moore’s Law [11].
B. Hash computations variations
Figure 2 displays the total number of hashing operations per day. We note that the num-
ber of daily hashes have increased from 1015 to 1025 in the period between September 2010
to May 2020 when this paper was written. Daily hashes have been growing at exponential
rates (linear trends in semi-log scale), which is in agreement with previous observations [12].
However, we can see from the figure that there are four, very distinct, periods with different
grow rates. Specifically: (i) mid 2010 to mid 2011; (ii) mid 2011 to early 2013; (iii) early
2013 to early 2015; (iv) early 2015 to early 2020. The estimated best-fit doubling times in
these periods are respectively: (1) 33 days; (ii) 261 days; (iii) 38 days; (iv) 198 days.
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FIG. 2: Daily hashes computed by the Bitcoin network. The lines are best-fits with exponential
growth laws in the corresponding sub-periods. Doubling times are respectively (i) 33 days, during
mid 2010 to mid 2011; (ii) 261 days, during mid 2011 to early 2013; (iii) 38 days during early 2013
to early 2015; (iv) 198 days, during early 2015 to early 2020.
C. Energy price variations
Figure 3 shows the variations of the energy price per gigajoule in the period 2010 to 2020
computed from the Brent Crude spot prices. One can notice that the cost of one gigajoule of
energy has two distinct levels - around 20 USD from 2011 to mid 2014 and around 10 USD
from late 2014 to early 2020. Oil prices has since collapsed under the coronavirus pandemic,
dropping to below 3 USD per gigajoule of energy. However, while large, the rate of change
in energy price is several orders of magnitude smaller than the rate of change in the number
of hashes.
D. Lower bound mining cost estimate
The lower bound of the total energy costs of Bitcoin mining is estimated as the minimum
energy cost of each hash multiplied by the total number of hashes computed over a given
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FIG. 3: Energy cost per gigajoule, measured in USD and converted from Brent Crude spot prices.
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FIG. 4: Total daily mining cost Ct, reported in USD, estimated by using Eq.3
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FIG. 5: Daily transaction volume Vt reported in USD.
period of time (a day in our case). Figure 4 reports the total mining daily cost in USD
estimated by using Eq.3, it varies from around 3 USD a day in 2010 to over 4 million USD
a day in early 2020. Note that this is the lower bound estimate and the actual cost is
presumably much larger. The growth in mining costs is affected by both the changes in
energy cost (see Fig.3) and by the increase in the hashing rate in the Bitcoin network (see
Fig.2). We note that the variations in energy cost oscillates in a much narrow band with
respect to the changes in the daily number of hashes and therefore, the minimum Bitcoin
mining costs (Figure 4) mostly mirrors the growth in the total number of hashes.
E. Transaction volume variations
During the last ten years the Bitcoin network activity has also increased with increasingly
larger amount of money transferred daily through the network. Figure 5 reports the total
transferred value per day in the Bitcoin network specified in USD. One can see that the total
daily volume of transactions has grown from about one thousand USD in 2010 to nearly one
billion USD in 2020 for an increase by nine orders of magnitude.
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FIG. 6: Ratio between the cost of mining and the total transaction volume Ct
Vt
on daily basis.
The band is the region between the upper and lower 10% quantiles and the line is the mean value,
which is 0.14%. The mean value since 2018 (last plateau) is instead 0.3%.
F. Ratio between mining cost and transaction volume
Figure 6 reports the ratio between the daily mining cost Ct and daily transaction volume
Vt. We observe that the ratio
Ct
Vt
does not have any increasing or decreasing trend but rather
is oscillating over the entire period from 2010 to 2020. The largest variations occurred in the
first few years then, after 2014, the ratio value has stabilized into a plateau with then a jump
to a higher plateau at the end of 2017 presumably due to the large decrease in Bitcoin price
from over 19, 000 USD in December 2017 to just a little over 3, 000 USD in December 2018.
Despite the change in this relation between mining costs and transaction volume in 2017-18
and the change in Bitcoin prices in the same period, we note that in general this ratio is not
correlated with the price of Bitcoin. There is actually a small negative correlation between
the two for the daily variations. Over the entire period, the mean value of Ct
Vt
is 0.14% with
bottom and top 10% quantiles with values equal to 0.02% and 0.4 % respectively. Note that
this band of oscillation is within one order of magnitude whereas the underlying quantities
Ct and Vt vary of nine orders of magnitude during the same period. If we limit our analysis
14
to the last period after end 2017, we obtain a mean at 0.3% and quantiles with values equal
to 0.1% and 0.4 %.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The proof of work allows a network of anonymous and untrustful parties to operate
together without central authority control. It is a powerful instrument to keep a distributed
system secure from malicious attacks. However, it has a high cost. We estimate that
presently at least a billion USD per year is burned by the Bitcoin network for the proof of
work. This amount corresponds to a one million times increase with respect to the costs
in 2010. However, although large, this amount is less than 0.5% of the transaction volume
over the network during the same period.
Using data from 2009 to 2020, this paper quantifies the lower bound for the energy costs
of Bitcoin mining and examines the relationship between this bound to the total value of
transactions over time. We reveal that the ratio between mining cost and total transaction
volume has not increased nor decreased over the last ten years despite Bitcoin mining activity
having increased by ten billion times during the same period. Such an overall constant ratio
is consistent with an argument, introduced by [1], suggesting that such a ratio must be a
sizable fraction of the transaction volume and it corresponds to the minimum fraction that
an attacker must double spend to make a profit (the quantity p in Eq.2). Assuming the
default block depth of N = 6 in equation 2, and using the last three years mean value for
the fraction Ct
Vt
at ∼ 0.3%, we obtain that Bitcoin proof of work protects from a double spend
attack at least a fraction around p ∼ 1.5% of the global transaction volume. This result
indicates that attacks that duplicate more than ∼ 1.5% of the transaction volume could be
profitable for the attacker because the cost of energy spent for the attack will be lower than
the gain from the attack. This being a lower bound estimate that realistically could be an
order of magnitude larger if all extra costs, beside the oil equivalent cost of mining energy,
are included.
We could therefore conclude that in the Bitcoin network the cost of proof of work is not
at all too high. On the contrary it is actually too low to protect against double spending
attacks. However, the proof of work is not the sole mechanism that provides protection
of the Bitcoin network. The system also depends upon the high entry barriers in terms of
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mining hardware and facilities costs. Further, Bitcoin value is built upon community trust
so once a majority attack has been detected, the Bitcoin value is likely to collapse together
with the potential attacker gains. This means that to launch a majority attack on Bitcoin,
the attacker would thus not only need to invest substantial amounts of energy resources
to gain over 50% of the hashing power, they would also have to accept that many of the
hardware costs incurred are unlikely to be recovered due to the inability of specialized ASICs
to be repurposed for uses other than cryptocurrency mining and that even if the attack was
successful, the value of Bitcoin would collapse so rapidly that there would be little economic
gain. Finally, an attack involving a large fraction of the Bitcoin volume would be most likely
detected by the network before its completion.
Distributed systems and Blockchains can be secured through several other mechanisms
that do not require computationally intensive proof of work. Indeed the proof of work is
a mechanism introduced to produce qualified voters in a system of anonymous untrustful
parties. Any mechanism that can verify identity of the voters or that can in any other way
avoid uncontrolled duplications of the voters can reduce or eliminate completely the cost
and even the need of a proof of work. However, these other mechanisms must relax also
some other properties such as anonymity, openness or equalitarian distributed verification.
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